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Experimental evaluation 
Conclusion 
Context: To provide high availability, software control applications, such as on-board train supervision applications must be fault-tolerant. 
The idea to guarantee dependability requirements is to enhance the  established approaches like the CBSE with fault tolerance mechanisms 
(e.g., replication techniques or degraded modes of operation) [1]. Furthermore, due to the nature of safety-critical software and its 
certification requirements, dependability requirements must be traceable along the development process in order to facilitate the certification 
process [2]. This context raises the following challenges. 
 
Challenge 1 (separation of concerns). In order to ensure that critical requirements are properly implemented, dependability requirements 
have to be separated from other requirements at each stage of software life-cycle 
 
Challenge 2 (traceability of concerns) In order to facilitate the certification process, dependability requirements have to be separated and 
traceable at each stage of software life-cycle, from requirement analysis to component instance. 
 
Proposal : Our contribution consists of an integrated component-based development and evolution process in order to enforce and trace 
dependability requirements during the entire development process 
Context, challenges and proposal 
Ø  Transformation of 
SARA components to 
timed automata model 
Ø Towards the formal 
verification of safety 
application model  
Ø  Based on some chosen benchmarks at rail-road level crossing 
area, a running example is evaluated throughout our component-
based development and evolution process. 
Ø The complete process shows that our two challenges, the 
traceability and the separation of functional and dependability 
requirements can be maintained during both the development and 
evolution process. 
SARA approach 
Ø  [1] Q. Enard, M. Stoicescu, E. Balland, C. Consel, 
L. Duchien, J.-C. Fabre, and M. Roy. Design-driven 
development methodology for resilient computing. In 
CBSE ’13, pages 59–64, 2013 
Ø [2] M. Sango, C. Gransart, and L. Duchien. Safety 
component-based approach and its application to ERTMS/
ETCS on-board train control system. In TRA2014 Transport 
Research Arena 2014, Paris, France, April 2014.  
References Future works 
Our approach consists of four phases: 
(a) The late requirement analysis phase, which consists in 
separating functional requirements from extra-functional 
requirements. We focus on dependability requirements, 
particularly, the degraded modes of operation. 
(b) The software design phase that contains two steps: 
(b.1) In the design time step, we model the requirements 
by components. We use the software component-based 
model [2], 
(b.2) In the development and scheduling analysis time 
step, we choose an appropriate development method for 
safety-critical systems. 
(c) The implementation and integration phase, which 
consists in implementing or generating the code in Ada 
Ravenscar profil. 
(d) The verification and validation phase, which consists in 
checking the temporal dependability requirements. 
Example of on-board train speed application 
requirements:   
Functional requirement (R1): “Calculation of 
a speed profile taking into account the train 
running / braking characteristics which are 
known on-board and the track description 
data” (ERTMS/ETCS specification) 
Dependability requirement (R2): “In case 
only the application of (the non-vital) service 
brake has been commanded and the service 
brake fails to be applied, the emergency 
brake command shall be given”. 
Temporal dependability requirement (R3): 
“once closed and when there is no train 
approaching meanwhile, the LC must be kept 
closed at least (Tbegin) and at most (Tend), 
where Tbegin and Tend are the time limits” 
Requirement Analysis Sofwatre component design Implementation  Simulation evaluation  
The	  model	  
implementa.on	  based	  
on	  the	  SARA’s	  API	  
(the	  open	  availability	  
code,	  Sara2Ada	  and	  
Sara2Ravenscar	  is	  
available	  in	  	  h>p://
urls.fr/sara). 
